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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
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 Helen McCray filed this action against her former 
employer, Corry Manufacturing Company, under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (West 
1985).  McCray contends that her request for the EEOC to 
reconsider its Determination of "no reasonable cause" to believe 
that Corry Manufacturing discriminated against McCray, 
accompanied by a Notice of Right to Sue, tolled the ninety day 
period for filing suit until the EEOC subsequently denied her 
request for reconsideration.  We hold that the district court did 
not err in concluding that the mere filing of a request for 
reconsideration does not toll the ninety day period for filing an 
ADEA civil action, especially here where the EEOC's denial of 
McCray's request for reconsideration informed her that the 
original ninety day period governed the time for filing a civil 
action.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the district 
court.       
 
I. 
 On October 29, 1992, McCray filed a charge of age 
discrimination with the EEOC against Corry Manufacturing.1 
According to McCray, her supervisor harassed her by engaging in 
"hypervigilant supervision," interfering with McCray's incoming 
telephone calls, removing McCray's telephone line and by 
repeatedly issuing unwarranted warnings for misconduct.  On 
                     
1
 McCray was born on November 23, 1934 and was employed 
by Corry Manufacturing from December 15, 1971 until January 9, 
1992.   
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January 9, 1992, McCray was advised that her position as a 
production control secretary was being eliminated but was offered 
another position.  McCray declined the position and was laid off 
effective January 9, 1992.   
 After investigating McCray's claims, the EEOC issued 
its Determination on August 31, 1993, finding that there was no 
reasonable cause to believe that Corry discriminated against 
McCray on the basis of her age.  McCray does not dispute that she 
received the Determination in due course.   
 The Determination contained the following information: 
This determination concludes the processing 
of the subject charge.  The Charging Party 
may pursue this matter by filing a private 
suit against the Respondent as set forth in 
the enclosed information sheet.  
(A. 21)  The "enclosed information sheet" entitled "Filing Suit 
In Federal District Court," often called a Notice of Right to 
Sue, informed McCray of the time period for bringing suit as 
follows: 
This determination becomes effective upon 
receipt.  Some or all of Charging Party's 
allegations of illegal employment 
discrimination have been dismissed.  If 
Charging Party wishes to pursue this 
matter(s), Charging Party must file a private 
lawsuit against the respondent named in the 
charge in U.S. District Court under the 
applicable statute(s), as set forth below. 
The determination letter and this notice will 
be the only notice of the Charging Party's 
right to sue by the Commission. 
 
. . . . 
 
PRIVATE SUIT RIGHTS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS AMENDED (TITLE 
VII), THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
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ACT OF 1967 (ADEA), AND THE AMERICAN WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA). 
 
ADEA charges with a date of alleged violation 
of November 21, 1991 or later . . .: Charging 
Party has 90 days from the effective date of 
this determination to file suit in court.  
Once this 90 day period is over, Charging 
Party's right to sue will be lost. 
(A. 22) (emphasis in original).  McCray concedes having received 
these instructions to file a civil action within ninety days of 
her receipt of the Determination and Notice of Right to Sue. 
 Less than thirty days later, by letter dated September 
27, 1993, McCray requested that the EEOC reconsider its 
Determination.  She provided additional facts regarding her 
employment with Corry Manufacturing from 1988 to 1992 and 
suggested that the EEOC visit the manufacturing facility rather 
than conduct telephone interviews.  By letter dated October 7, 
1993, the EEOC denied McCray's request for reconsideration.2  In 
that letter, the EEOC informed McCray that most of the facts set 
forth in her request for reconsideration could not be considered 
                     
2
 On appeal, McCray also raises conduct of EEOC 
representatives regarding the reconsideration of her claim that 
arguably would permit her to invoke the theory of equitable 
tolling to bring her civil action within the ninety day 
limitations period.  Specifically, she contends that the EEOC 
encouraged her to request reconsideration, that in November of 
1993 the EEOC told her they would come to the Corry Manufacturing 
facility to pursue further action and that it was not until 
November 24, 1993 that she was told by the EEOC that her case was 
closed.   
 
 McCray, however, did not raise these allegations in the 
district court nor did she preserve them for appeal.  Rather, she 
raised the equitable tolling theory for the first time in her 
Reply Brief before us.  As such, we will grant Corry 
Manufacturing's pending Motion to Strike Reply Brief For 
Appellant in an order we will file separately. 
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by the EEOC because they were time-barred by the 300 day statute 
of limitations for filing charges of discrimination.  See 29 
C.F.R. § 1626.7 (1993) (timeliness of ADEA charge).  More 
importantly, the EEOC informed McCray that: 
If you wish to continue to pursue your 
allegations, you have the right to file a 
civil law suit in the appropriate U.S. 
District Court in accordance with the 
instructions which were included in your 
original letter of determination.   
(A. 25).  Those instructions for filing a civil lawsuit were 
contained within the Notice of Right to Sue that McCray 
acknowledges she received.  This subsequent letter was received 
less than forty days after the Notice of Right to Sue was issued. 
 Nonetheless, McCray did not file a Complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania until January 3, 1994, more than ninety days from 
the August 31, 1993 EEOC Determination and the Notice informing 
her to file suit within ninety days.  Specifically, McCray filed 
her Complaint 125 days after the issuance of the August 31, 1993 
Determination and more than ninety days from her receipt of the 
Determination.  Corry Manufacturing moved for summary judgment on 
grounds that McCray failed to file her Complaint within ninety 
days of her receipt of the EEOC's August 31, 1993 Determination 
and Notice of Right to Sue.   
 By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated December 2, 1994, 
the district court granted Corry Manufacturing's motion for 
summary judgment, determining that McCray's claim was time-barred 
for her failure to file her Complaint within ninety days of her 
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receipt of the EEOC Determination and Notice of Right to Sue. See 
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(e) (West Supp. 1995).  McCray appeals, 
asserting that her request for reconsideration tolled the ninety 
day period that commenced with her receipt of the EEOC's 
determination; rather, the ninety days commenced from the EEOC's 
notice of its termination of the reconsideration proceedings. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 29 
U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(1)(2) (West 1985).  Our jurisdiction is 
premised on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).  We exercise plenary 
review over this question of law.  Turner v. Schering-Plough 
Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
II. 
 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act was amended 
effective November 21, 1991 to include a ninety day rather than a 
two year statute of limitations for the filing of civil actions 
in federal court and to require that the EEOC notify the claimant 
that proceedings on his or her charge of discrimination were 
dismissed or otherwise terminated.  See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1079.  See also H.R. Conference 
Rep. No. 101-856, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (October 12, 1990) 
(comments regarding amendments to Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act).  The ADEA provides: 
If a charge filed with the Commission under 
this chapter is dismissed or the proceedings 
of the Commission are otherwise terminated by 
the Commission, the Commission shall notify 
the person aggrieved.  A civil action may be 
brought under this section by a person 
defined in section 630(a) of this title 
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against the respondent named in the charge 
within 90 days after the date of the receipt 
of such notice. 
 
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(e) (West Supp. 1995); see Sperling v. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Inc., 24 F.3d 463, 464 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing 
amendment to the ADEA statute of limitations).   
 It is undisputed that McCray received the EEOC's August 
31, 1993 Determination and the Notice of Right to Sue in due 
course.  As well, McCray admits that the initial Determination 
advised her that she must file a civil action within ninety days 
of her receipt of the Determination.  The ninety day period for 
the filing of McCray's civil action therefore commenced on or 
about August 31, 1993 and ended on or about November 29, 1993. 
Thus, under the usual application of the statute, McCray's 
Complaint was untimely.  We thus examine the effect, if any, on 
the ninety day statute of limitations of a claimant's request for 
reconsideration of the EEOC Determination when the request was 
made within the ninety day period following receipt of the 
Determination.   
 
A. 
 McCray asserts that the ninety day period was tolled by 
her September 27, 1993 request for reconsideration to the EEOC. 
According to McCray, the final action of the EEOC for purposes of 
commencing the ninety day filing period would then be the EEOC's 
October 7, 1993 denial of her request for reconsideration -- when 
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the EEOC "otherwise terminated" its proceedings on McCray's 
charge.  See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(e) (West Supp. 1995).   
 The EEOC's October 7, 1993 denial of reconsideration, 
however, does not supplant the August 31, 1993 Determination as 
the final agency action merely because the EEOC discussed the 
merits of McCray's charge in concluding that McCray had "not 
provided any new evidence that would change [its] finding."  As 
the Supreme Court stated: 
 It is irrelevant that the [EEOC]'s order 
refusing reconsideration discussed the merits 
of the . . . claims at length.  Where the 
[EEOC]'s formal disposition is to deny 
reconsideration, and where it makes no 
alteration in the underlying order, we will 
not undertake an inquiry into whether 
reconsideration "in fact" occurred.  In a 
sense, of course, it always occurs, since one 
cannot intelligently rule upon a petition to 
reconsider without reflecting upon, among 
other things, whether clear error was shown. 
It would hardly be sensible to say that the 
[EEOC] can genuinely deny reconsideration 
only when it gives the matter no thought; nor 
to say that the character of its action (as 
grant or denial) depends upon whether it 
chooses to disclose its reasoning.  Rather, 
it is the [EEOC]'s formal action, rather than 
its discussion, that is dispositive. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brotherhood 
of Locomotive Engineers et al., 482 U.S. 270, 280-81 (1987) 
(petitions for judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission 
orders).  To hold otherwise would permit claimants to manipulate 
the ninety day filing period merely by requesting reconsideration 
to extend the limitations period.  See generally Locomotive 
Engineers, 482 U.S. at 281.  Such a result was not contemplated 
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by Congress given the imposition of the ninety day statute of 
limitations in the first instance nor is there any support in the 
EEOC Regulations for tolling the ninety day filing period when 
the only action is a claimant's request for reconsideration of 
the EEOC's Determination.   
 
B. 
 We recognize the effect of the EEOC regulation 
governing the impact of reconsideration on the statute of 
limitations for filing Title VII and Americans with Disabilities 
Act ("ADA") civil actions:  
 (b) The Commission may on its own 
initiative reconsider a final determination 
of no reasonable cause and an issuing 
director may, on his or her own initiative 
reconsider his or her final determination of 
no reasonable cause.  If the Commission or an 
issuing director decides to reconsider a 
final no cause determination, a notice of 
intent to reconsider shall promptly issue to 
all parties to the charge.  If such notice of 
intent to reconsider is issued within 90 days 
of receipt of the final no cause 
determination, and the person claiming to be 
aggrieved or the person on whose behalf a 
charge was filed has not filed suit and did 
not request and receive a notice of right to 
sue pursuant to § 1601.28(a)(1) or (2), the 
notice of intent to reconsider shall vacate 
the letter of determination and shall revoke 
the charging party's right to bring suit 
within 90 days.  If the 90 day suit period 
has expired, the charging party has filed 
suit, or the charging party had requested a 
notice of right to sue pursuant to 
§1601.28(a)(1) or (2), the notice of intent 
to reconsider shall vacate the letter of 
determination, but shall not revoke the 
charging party's right to sue in 90 days. 
After reconsideration, the Commission or 
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issuing director shall issue a new 
determination.  In those circumstances where 
the charging party's right to bring suit in 
90 days was revoked, the determination shall 
include notice that a new 90 day suit period 
shall begin upon the charging party's receipt 
of the determination.  Where a member of the 
Commission has filed a Commissioner charge, 
he or she shall abstain from making a 
determination in that case. 
 
29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(b) (1993).  There is no counterpart 
regulation governing reconsideration of claims under the ADEA.3 
See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626 et seq. (1993).  The EEOC amended section 
1601.19(b) on March 7, 1991 to make the current Title VII 
procedural regulations applicable to both charges under Title VII 
and under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 
U.S.C.A. 12101 et seq.  See 56 Fed. Reg. 9623 (March 7, 1991).4 
However, there has not been any amendment to the ADEA regulations 
                     
3
 The dissent argues that it nevertheless is reasonable 
for an ADEA claimant to rely on the EEOC's acceptance of the 
claimant's request for reconsideration and processing of the 
request in concluding that the 90-day limitations period begins 
to run from the date of the denial of reconsideration. 
(Dissenting op. at 2).  There is no impact on the 90-day 
limitations period, however, where the EEOC's "processing" 
constitutes nothing more than a review of the request for 
reconsideration in light of the evidence previously considered, 
ultimately resulting in the denial of the request for 
reconsideration.  To interpret such "processing" as tolling the 
limitations period essentially permits a claimant's filing a 
request for reconsideration to start a new limitations period 
running; a proposition that the dissent agrees should not prevail 
in the absence of more than just the claimant's request.  Id. 
This is especially true here where the EEOC's "processing" took 
only ten days from the date of McCray's request for 
reconsideration, leaving her with more than 50 days in which to 
file a civil action. 
4
 These amendments were made pursuant to the statutory 
mandate within the ADA that incorporated the powers, remedies and 
procedures of Title VII set forth at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4 - 
2000e-9.  56 Fed. Reg. 9623 (March 7, 1991). 
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to provide for a reconsideration provision nor has section 
1601.19 been amended to include charges under the ADEA despite 
the amendments to the ADEA itself to conform the time limits for 
filing a civil action to those for Title VII and the imposition 
of the requirement that the EEOC issue notices of right to sue 
for ADEA claims.  In the absence of an indication that section 
1601.19(b) is applicable to ADEA claims, we are compelled to 
decline to extend those reconsideration provisions to claims 
under the ADEA.   
 Even if we were to broaden the scope of section 
1601.19(b) to include ADEA claims, it would be to no avail in 
saving McCray's claim from summary judgment.  Section 1601.19(b) 
revokes the charging party's right to bring suit only if the EEOC 
issues a notice of its intent to reconsider within ninety days of 
the claimant's receipt of a no cause determination, the claimant 
has not filed suit yet and the claimant did not request and 
receive a notice of right to sue pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 
§§1601.28(a)(1) or (2).5  See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(b).  See also 
                     
5
 Section 1601.28(a)(1) and (2) provide: 
 
 (a) Issuance of notice of right to sue 
upon request. 
 
 (1) When a person claiming to be 
aggrieved requests, in writing, that a notice 
of right to sue be issued and the charge to 
which the request relates is filed against a 
respondent other than a government, 
governmental agency or political subdivision, 
the Commission shall promptly issue such 
notice as described in s 1601.28(e) to all 
parties, at any time after the expiration of 
one hundred eighty (180) days from the date 
of filing of the charge with the Commission, 
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Lute v. Singer Co., 678 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1982) (construing 
pre-regulation EEOC reconsideration of a Title VII complaint and 
rescission of a previously issued right to sue notice).  Here, 
although McCray requested reconsideration within the ninety day 
filing period, the EEOC never issued a notice of intent to 
reconsider that would revoke McCray's right to bring suit 
pursuant to the Notice of Right to Sue issued on August 31, 1993. 
More importantly, McCray was notified by the EEOC in its October 
7, 1993 denial of her request for reconsideration that the August 
31, 1993 Right to Sue Notice was controlling for the filing of a 
civil action.  We find no basis, equitable6 or otherwise, to 
                                                                  
or in the case of a Commissioner charge 180 
days after the filing of the charge or 180 
days after the expiration of any period of 
reference under section 706(d) of Title VII 
as appropriate. 
 
 (2) When a person claiming to be 
aggrieved requests, in writing, that a notice 
of right to sue be issued, and the charge to 
which the request relates is filed against a 
respondent other than a government, 
governmental agency or political subdivision, 
the Commission may issue such notice as 
described in s 1601.28(e) with copies to all 
parties, at any time prior to the expiration 
of 180 days from the date of filing the 
charge with the Commission; provided, that 
the District Director . . . has determined 
that it is probable that the Commission will 
be unable to complete its administrative 
processing of the charge within 180 days from 
the filing of the charge and has attached a 
written certificate to that effect. 
 
29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1994). 
6
 See supra n.1 at 4 discussing the inapplicability of 
equitable tolling to save McCray's claim from dismissal. 
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disturb the district court's judgment that McCray's Complaint was 
untimely. 
III. 
 Accordingly, because we hold that merely requesting 
reconsideration of an EEOC Determination does not toll the ninety 
day statute of limitations controlling the filing of a civil 




Helen McCray v. Corry Manufacturing Company, No. 95-3004. 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 Because I believe that plaintiff timely filed an age discrimination suit in 
federal court, I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff in this case has diligently pursued her 
claims against her employer.  She timely filed her age discrimination charge with the 
applicable agency, the EEOC.  When the EEOC dismissed the charges 10 months later, 
plaintiff wrote a letter requesting that the EEOC reconsider its decision.  The EEOC 
accepted plaintiff's request for reconsideration, considered whether she had presented new 
evidence of age discrimination, and finally denied the request.  The entire 
reconsideration stage occurred within plaintiff's initial 90-day limitations period for 
filing suit in federal court.  Importantly, plaintiff was not represented by counsel in 
any of the proceedings before the agency.    
 Plaintiff concluded that a new limitations period for filing claims in federal 
court began running from the date of the letter denying the request for reconsideration.  
Although the ADEA and its accompanying regulations do not expressly provide for 
reconsideration of the EEOC's decisions, plaintiff reasonably relied on the actions of the 
EEOC in accepting and finally denying her request for reconsideration.  The equities in 
this case favor allowing plaintiff the benefit of a new limitations period which began 
running as soon as the agency denied the request for reconsideration.  
 Importantly, I agree with the majority and do not suggest that an ADEA 
claimant's filing of a request for reconsideration without more starts a new limitations 
period running.  Because the current ADEA regulations do not provide for reconsideration, 
a claimant cannot unilaterally extend the period for instituting suit, merely by filing a 
request for reconsideration.  However, if the EEOC accepts the ADEA claimant's request and 
processes it, then it is reasonable for the claimant to rely upon the action taken in 
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concluding that the 90-day limitations period begins running from the date of the denial 
of reconsideration, and that she is not required to start suit earlier.     
 The following statutory argument provides additional support for the conclusion 
that the EEOC's reconsideration of plaintiff's claim extended the time for filing suit in 
federal court.  Section 626(e) of the ADEA provides that the person aggrieved shall be 
notified if the charge is dismissed or if "the proceedings of the Commission are otherwise 
terminated by the Commission."  29 U.S.C.A. § 626(e) (West Supp. 1995).  This section 
further provides that: "A civil action may be brought . . . within 90 days after the date 
of the receipt of such notice." Id.  By denying plaintiff's request for reconsideration in 
the instant case, the EEOC has "otherwise terminated" the proceedings.  Therefore, based 
on the express language of the statute, the 90-day limitations period began running upon 
plaintiff's receipt of the letter denying the request for reconsideration.   
  General administrative law and the rules governing the review of federal court 
decisions provide further support for the conclusion that the deadline for filing a civ
action should be extended until after the agency finishes processing a request for 
reconsideration.  To illustrate, the Supreme Court in Civil Aeronautics Board v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961), referred to the general principle that an order from an 
administrative agency is not ready for judicial review until the agency disposes of 
outstanding petitions for reconsideration. Id. at 326.  Similarly, the rules governing 
review of federal court decisions provide that a timely request for reconsideration 
automatically extends the time for filing a notice of appeal or a petition for writ of 
certiorari.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) (appeal from district court judgment); United 
States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976) (Supreme Court review). 
 Furthermore, I believe that the district court erroneously relied on a single 
sentence in the EEOC's letter denying plaintiff's request for reconsideration.  See
McCray v. Corry Manufacturing Company, No. 94-3, slip op. at 6 (Dec. 2, 1994 W.D. Pa.).  
The sentence states that plaintiff must file a civil action "in accordance with the 
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instructions which were included in [her] original letter of determination."  App. at 77.  
This sentence is not determinative of the question whether the limitations period begins
anew after the EEOC has processed the request for reconsideration.  This sentence could 
reasonably be interpreted as merely referring the reader back to the original letter of 
determination which states that the applicable limitations period is 90 days and instructs 
the reader regarding the filing of a private lawsuit.   
 For the foregoing reasons, I believe that plaintiff's complaint was timely 
filed, and, therefore, I would reverse the district court's entry of summary judgment in 
favor of defendant. 
 
   
